

**CPW4U7 – PAPER ONE TEST – INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO JAPANESE  
AGGRESSION, 1931-1941**

*Japan and the League of Nations*

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

**October 25, 2016**

*Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow. Sources may have been edited from the original: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses...; minor changes are not indicated.*

**Source A:** Extract from Alan Farmer. *Britain Foreign Affairs, 1919-39* (1996).


If action was to be taken, US support was vital, but that support was not forthcoming. Japanese imperialism, although a potential threat to British interests in the Far East, was not an immediate danger. Indeed Japanese expansion in northern China could be seen as reducing the risk of Japanese expansion in other, more sensitive, areas (for example, Southeast Asia).

Economic sanctions were unlikely to achieve much. The Royal Navy was not strong enough to enforce a trade embargo, and the USA, Japan's biggest trading partner, made it clear it would not support any League action. The best policy therefore seemed to be to accept Japan's takeover of Manchuria and to hope that the Japanese threat did not develop.

**Source B:** Winston Churchill speaking in the House of Commons, 17 February 1933. Cites in Ronald Cameron, *Appeasement and the Road to War* (1991).

Now I must say something to you which is very unfashionable. I am going to say a word of sympathy for Japan, not necessarily for her policy, but for her position and her national difficulties. I do not think the League of Nations would be well advised to quarrel with Japan. The League has great work to do in Europe... there is no more use affronting Japan than there would be in ordering the Swiss and Czechoslovak natives to the Yellow Sea... I hope we in England shall try to understand a little the position of Japan, an ancient State, with the highest sense of national honour and patriotism, and with a teeming population and remarkable energy. On the one side they see the dark menace of Soviet Russia. On the other the chaos of China, four of five provinces of which are now being tortured under Communist rule.

**Source C:** A cartoon by David Low, “The Doormat”, published in the UK newspaper the *Evening Standard*, January 1933.



**Source D:** Extract from R.J. Overy. *Origins of the Second World War* (2008).

In 1933 Japan left the League and effectively removed the system of collective security. In 1934, in violation of international agreements to preserve an “open door” policy in China, the Japanese government announced the Amau Doctrine, a warning to other powers to regard China as Japan’s sphere of influence and to abandon trade with the Chinese and the provision of technical aid to them. There is no doubt that Japanese leaders, spurred on at home by the military, were encouraged to go further after 1932 than they might otherwise have done because of the weak response from the major powers.

**Questions:**

1. a) What according to Source D, was the result of the Manchurian crisis for Japan's future actions in China? (3 marks)  
b) What is the message conveyed in Source C? (2 marks)
2. With reference to their origin, purpose and content, assess the value and limitations of Source B for historians studying Japanese aggression in the 1930s. (4 marks)
3. Compare and contrast Source A and Source D concerning Japanese aggression and international perception regarding actions in China. (6 marks)
4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, examine why the League of Nations did not take stronger action to deal with the Manchurian crisis. (9 marks)